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The role played by imperfect information in business fluctuations has received
increasing attention since Lucas's early work.
1 However, the locus of that at-
tention has shifted from systematic misperceptions of the sources of price
shocks in the original Lucas form of imperfect information to the macroeco-
nomic consequences of information-related microeconomic failures.
2 This pa-
per seeks to summarize a major development of this latter literature, to inte-
grate that development into a standard macroeconomic model and to provide
a reformulation that casts additional light on the mechanism by which mone-
tary policy affects the economy. The microeconomic failures in question occur
most significantly in financial markets. In credit markets, it is by now well
established that lenders who are less well-informed than borrowers about the
risk characteristics of the borrower's investment projects may well respond by
fixing interest rates and (under certain conditions) rationing credit.
3 In equity
markets, it is equally well established that, when potential equity issuers are
better informed about their future prospects than potential equity purchasers,
raising funds by issuing new equity may be a highly costly, if not prohibitively
difficult, undertaking.
4 Briefly and crudely stated, the significant macroeco-
nomic consequences of these financial market failures (which are essentially
microeconomic in nature) include an increase in the importance of internally
generated funds in determining firm behavior—especially investment behav-
ior; a reduction in the importance of interest rates as a determinant of borrow-
ing and investment (and hence as a macroeconomically stabilizing variable);
amplification of the output responses of firms to demand and other distur-
bances, the risk and cash flow consequences of which cannot be shifted
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either by issuing equity or by increased borrowing (leading to accelerator-like
behavior); and significant changes in the likely consequences of macroeco-
nomic policy.
However, financial markets are not the sole area of impact of imperfect
information on macroeconomic behavior. Efficiency wage models of labor-
market behavior and comparable models of product markets have made im-
portant contributions both to understanding macroeconomic phenomena like
unemployment and to investigating likely paths of adjustment between mac-
roeconomic equilibria.
5 Thus the paper's basic model of financial market fail-
ures is extended to incorporate the impacts of these further informational im-
perfections in labor and product markets.
The paper consists, therefore, of five sections. The first two describe the
impact of imperfect information in financial markets on investment and loan-
market behavior, respectively. A third section incorporates these behaviors
into a traditional IS-LM model of macroeconomic equilibria. The fourth sec-
tion then briefly discusses an extension of the model to examine likely paths
of adjustment between equilibria when labor and product markets also suffer
from information imperfections. Finally, a fifth section investigates the long-
run growth implications of the model.
1.1 Firm Behavior and Investment
The model of firm behavior that will be used is essentially that of Green-
wald and Stiglitz (1987). Firm decision makers maximize the expected end-
of-period equity of the firm minus an expected cost of bankruptcy, which is
simply the cost of bankruptcy times the probability of bankruptcy.
6 We as-
sume initially that firms use only circulating capital; inputs must be paid be-




where d{qt) is the expected end-of-period equity, c(qt) is the cost of bank-
ruptcy, which we will assume is linear in qt (the size of the firm) so that c(qt)
= cqt, PB is the probability of bankruptcy, and qt is the firm's capital stock in
period t, which is also, in this circulating capital world, the output that the
firm has available for sale at the end of period t. Here, end-of-period equity is
a{qt) = pfl, ~ U+f()5,,
where pt is price of output at the end of period t, bt is the firm's indebtedness
at the beginning of period t, and f, is the return to borrowers, which is a
random variable (as is pt) since the firm may go bankrupt and default on its
loans. Then17 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing
a{qt) = qt-{\+ft)bt,
where ft is the expected value of ft and the expected price level is normalized
at one.
Bankruptcy occurs if the end-of-period value of the firm, at, is less than
zero;if
where rt is the contractual level of interest that the firm promised to pay debt-
holders at the beginning of period t. The debt incurred by the firm at begin-
ning of period t is
where we assume that output is produced with a constant-returns-to-scale
technology using only labor as an input,
8 €, is the amount of labor needed per
unit of output, at_l = p,_lqt_l — (1 +r,_,)£,_, is the equity level that the firm inherits from period t — 1, and we assume for the moment that no divi-
dends are paid out.
The cost of bankruptcy incurred here represents the cost to managers of the
firm (i.e., those deciding on output levels). The justification for such bank-
ruptcy costs is twofold. First, in a world of imperfect information, outside
observers cannot distinguish between failure due to incompetent management
and failure due to bad luck (which is idiosyncratic to the type of firm in ques-
tion). As a result, failure will unavoidably stigmatize managers whether it is
deserved or not. The negative impact of this failure on their future earnings is,
therefore, what is represented by the cost c(qt).
9 Alternatively, the imposition
of a punishment—termination of employment—associated with failure may
be one way to structure management incentive contracts that are characterized
by sharing rules for positive profits but have no means of credibly forcing
managers to participate in losses. And, for these purposes, bankruptcy may
be one natural point for assessing such penalties since the ability of manage-
ment to conceal losses is greatly reduced under such circumstances. Having
bankruptcy costs increase with firm size then simply reflects the fact that a
larger scale of operation requires more managers. The advantages of this kind
of interpretation of bankruptcy cost are, first, that it enables bankruptcy costs
to play a larger role in firm decisions than estimates of actual reorganization
cost, which are relatively small, would imply;
1
0 second, that relatively high
bankruptcy costs of this kind account for the observed fact that bankruptcy is
a rare event that managers appear to strive disproportionately actively to
avoid.
1
1 Finally, we will assume that reorganization costs to debtholders are
zero.
We will assume that the contractual rate of interest paid by firms is set to
yield an expected return to debtholders that equals a required return, ft. For18 Bruce C. Greenwald/Joseph E. Stiglitz
the moment we will assume that the equity-constrained firms are not credit
rationed.
Thus, each firm's decision makers maximize
(1) q, ~ (l+f,)(w,et)q, + (1 + R,)a,_l ~ cq,PB,
where the probability of bankruptcy,
PB = F[ut],
where ut = price below which firms go bankrupt = (1 +Rt)wt£t — (at_l/qt), F is the distribution function of pt, and the contractual rate of interest, rt, is
determined, simultaneously with iit, by the equation
1
2
(2) (1 +rt)[w.£, — (a. ,/q.)] = u.[l—F(u.)] + \p.dF(p,).
J
0
In this last equation, the right-hand side represents the expected return re-
quired by borrowers per unit of output (i.e., the required return, 1 +ft, times
the amount borrowed per unit of output). The left-hand side represents the
actual expected return to borrowers per unit of output as a function of ut. The
definition of ut implies that the return from selling the output qt atM, just covers
the contractual return to debtholders (i.e., 1 +rt). At prices below ut, the re-
turns to debtholders are just ptqt (since they receive the entire proceeds from
sales of output) or pt per unit of output (see appendix for derivation).
The optimal level of output (and hence investment), qt, which solves this
maximization problem, depends positively and linearly on at_x, since the
maximand, on being divided by at_x, is a function of (qtlat_x) and ut depends on qt only through (qtlat_x).
n The first-order condition determining the opti-
mal level of {qjat_^} takes the form
dPB
du
The left-hand side of this equation is the expected end-of-period return to
output (investment) and the right-hand side is the expected marginal cost of
output, including the marginal increase in bankruptcy costs associated with
higher levels of output (the second and third right-hand-side terms). The out-
put (investment) function of a typical firm can, therefore, be written as
(3) qt = h(wt,rt,<jt)at_v
where a, represents the spread of the price distribution, F, and
K <0,hr< 0, and ha < 0.
The levels of firm output and investment depend not just on the expected
return to investment, which depends in turn on wages and interest rates as it
does in the traditional case, but also on the firm's equity level and the level of19 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing
uncertainty concerning future prices. Higher equity levels mean that the same
level of output (and hence investment) can be attained with a lower level of
borrowing and thus with a lower risk of bankruptcy. Moreover, under quite
general circumstances (e.g., if bankruptcy is an event that occurs in the lower
tail of a single-peaked distribution of prices), then higher equity levels also
lower the incremental risk of bankruptcy associated with any given level of
output (investment). This means that higher equity levels reduce the incre-
mental cost of higher output and, thus, lead to increased output and invest-
ment.
14
Increased uncertainty about future profitability has an opposite effect.
Greater uncertainty increases both the absolute and incremental risk of bank-
ruptcy under quite general conditions at any level of investment (output) and
firm equity. Thus, firms respond by lowering investment (and output) since
they cannot absorb the increased risks by issuing more equity.
Complete specification of the output and investment model then requires an
equation describing the evolution of equity levels. Substitution from the defi-
nitions of bt into the definition of at yields
a, = PA, ~ U+r,)(wtet-at_l).
Thus, firm equity levels in period t are firm equity levels in period t—\ plus
profits (including a shadow return on at_^). The critical assumption here is
that a firm does not have recourse to external equity markets.
The formal rationale for such an assumption is developed in the Appendix
below. It is, however, straightforward to describe the arguments involved.
Suppose that in addition to the level of output, qt, prices, wages, and interest
rates, the profitability of each firm depends on an unobservable productivity
variable. If all firms look identical to potential investors, then firms with high
levels of unobserved productivity (and hence future profits) will sell stock on
the same terms as those with low levels of unobserved productivity. However,
the cost of selling any given amount of stock is higher for the high-
productivity firm since the shares that it sells represents a portion of a higher
level of profits. Thus, only low-productivity firms would sell stock on these
terms.
1
5 However, in doing so, they would identify themselves as low-
productivity firms with a resulting negative impact on their current market
values. If, therefore, firms (or their managers) are concerned with the current
as well as the future market values of their equity, this second effect may deter
even low-productivity firms from issuing equity.
Allowing for dividends leads to only a slight modification of the equity
equation as long as dividend levels are fixed. Then, the end-of-period equity
of the firm becomes
(4) fl^M.-O + WrU-rf,
where dt is the level of dividends. The rationale for such an assumption is
similar to that for restricting equity issues. Dividends are negative equity is-20 Bruce C. Greenwaid/Joseph E. Stiglitz
sues to which a firm has made a prior commitment. Only low-productivity
firms with a high incremental value for such funds as protection against bank-
ruptcy would seek to abandon this commitment and the consequent negative
signal involved should discourage such changes.
1
6
If a firm is, in addition, constrained in the amount of debt that it can issue
and that constraint is binding, then the output function is even simpler. Let bt
denote the maximum level of allowed borrowing, then
wtttqt = dollar amount of investment = (a,_l + bt),
which is inherited equity plus the level of borrowing allowed under the credit
constraint. If the output (investment) of these firms is added to that of firms
which are merely equity constrained, then the aggregate investment function
will now include the allowed borrowing level, bt, as an explanatory variable.
The investment function of equation (3) can thus be rewritten as
(5) qt = h{wt,ft,vt,at_x,bt),
where bt represents the level of rationed credit and hb > 0.
Extending the circulating capital model to incorporate investment in long-
lived physical capital is principally a matter of redefining the production pe-
riod. Consider a firm whose sole investment project consists of a plant with a
fixed life of T periods. Assume for simplicity that funds borrowed to support
the plant are due to be repaid (including accrued interest) at the end of period
T, that input costs and output revenues are contemporaneous in each subpe-
riod t = 1, ... T (or at least are subject to minimal uncertainty looking
forward from the beginning of each subperiod), and that intervening subpe-
riod profits are reinvested at a safe rate of return, r*, the end-of-period-T re-
turn to the plant investment is
where %t(k) is the profit in subperiod t looking forward from the time of the
initial investment, which is a random variable and a function of that initial
investment, k. The end-of-period — T equity of the firm is then
where bo is the level of initial borrowing and ro is the contractual rate of return
on that borrowing. If dT is less than zero, the firm goes bankrupt and incurs a
bankruptcy cost proportional to its scale of operation, k. Finally, initial bor-
rowing by the firm is simply
b0 = pkk - ao,
where pk is the price of capital goods and ao is the initial equity of the firm.
If 7r(&) is linear in fc (i.e., constant returns to scale), this long-run invest-
ment problem is identical in structure to the circulating capital formulation21 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing
described above. Thus, nothing in the model restricts the definition of invest-
ment to circulating capital and the basic implications of financial market
imperfections in the circulating capital model (e.g., the dependence of invest-
ment on both inherited equity and the uncertainty of the economic environ-
ment),
1
7 can apply equally well with fixed capital investment.
Several points should be made about the nature of aggregate (and individual
firm) investment behavior implicit in equations (4) and (5). First, high profit-
ability in any given period, by generating increases in firm equity levels (for
non-credit-constrained firms) and increased cash flow (for credit-constrained
firms), will lead to increased future investment. Thus, the model suggests the
kind of significant relationship between current operating cash flow and in-
vestment found by Hubbard, Fazzari, and Petersen (1988), among others.
Also, if high profitability in any period is related to increases in demand in
that period, the model will exhibit the kind of accelerator behavior that has
been so successful in explaining actual investment behavior.
1
8 The model can
be usefully thought of, therefore, as providing a microeconomic rationale for
both the cash flow and accelerator aspects of investment behavior that appear
to play such a significant role in practice.
1
9 Second, firms wishing to borrow
pay firm-specific rates of interest, not some average rate on all assets. With
imperfectly informed lenders, changes in general market rates do not neces-
sarily lead to changes in the rates charged to borrowing firms.
20 Some part of
the shift in loan supply is absorbed by increased credit rationing since charg-
ing higher interest rates has an adverse effect on the quality and riskiness of
the borrower pool (see below). Thus, the rate, rt (and the associated expected
return to lenders ft), which enters the investment model above may vary sig-
nificantly less than widely observed market rates (such as Treasury-bill rates),
which would be available for use in any empirically estimated investment
equation. Second, the impact of interest rates tends to be small relative to the
impact of changes in a firm's financial position,
2
1 and real interest-rate series
have, until the very recent past, been observably quite stable. Thus, the vari-
ability in the financial positions of firms and the perceived riskiness of the
environment they face over the business cycle can be responsible for a far
greater share of the variation in investment over time than market interest
rates. For both reasons, the model provides an explanation for the relatively
small and elusive role that interest rates play in empirical investment equa-




Finally, as will be noted extensively in later sections of this paper, invest-
ment, although defined for explanatory purposes as investment in physical
capital of the usual sort, need not and should not be interpreted so narrowly.
Part of investment takes the form of working capital and the hiring and train-
ing of workers, and a rise in the cost of investment (because, e.g., of a dete-
rioration in a firm's equity position) will be reflected as a reduction in working
capital, in employment, and, since the costs of working capital and hiring are22 Bruce C. Greenwald/Joseph E. Stiglitz
part of the costs that determine aggregate supply, in aggregate supply and
labor demand. Pricing, too, may have an important investment component. If
future demand depends on current sales, then firms will invest in future de-
mand by lowering current prices and expanding current sales.
2
3 An increase
in the cost of investment will consequently appear as an increase in current
prices and a reduction in current output as firms respond by reducing invest-
ments in future demand. Again, therefore, a reduction in investment will ap-
pear as a reduction in current supply. Productivity growth may also have an
important investment component through both research and development
spending, the learning associated with the implementation of new technolo-
gies embodied in fixed capital investment, and the "learning-by-doing" re-
lated to higher current output. Thus, the idea of investment should not be
narrowly construed as relating solely to fixed investment, and in what follows
we will take such a broad view.
1.2 Credit Rationing and Loan Markets
In describing loan markets, this section will focus on the role of bank lend-
ing. The justification for doing this is threefold. First, cyclical changes in firm
financing are dominated by changes in short-term bank financing. This is es-
pecially true at the peak and during the downward phase of the cycle.
2
4 Sec-
ond, the role (or lack of role) of monetary policy is central to macroeconomic
theory and, in most modern industrial societies, the proximate impact of mon-
etary policy is on the banking system. Therefore, in examining the role of
monetary policy, the banking system is a logical point of departure. Finally, a
model of loan markets based on bank lending appears relatively easy to extend
to incorporate direct lending to firms, whereas the opposite—extending a di-




We will assume, following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), that lenders are un-
able to distinguish among borrowers, that borrowers accept a common fixed
loan size, and that as the contractual rate of interest charged borrowers rises,
the quality of the borrower pool falls.
2
6 This occurs because the pool of bor-
rowers at high contractual interest rates consists to a disproportionate degree
of those who, because they have high expected default rates, do not face com-
parably high expected interest rates. This means that as contractual interest
rates rise, the expected returns on loans may first rise, but ultimately fall as
the cost of deterioration in the borrower pool outweighs the direct gains from
higher contractual rates. The deterioration in the default rate may also be be-
cause of adverse incentive effects. At the same time, the variance of loan re-
turns should rise steadily with rising contractual rates of interest as default
rates arise. Changes in contractual rates of interest will, therefore, trace out a
mean-variance frontier of loan returns as illustrated in figure 1.1. We will
assume that the expected return on this frontier peaks at a contractual interest23 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing
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Fig. 1.1 Optimal bank behavior (credit rationing case)




Next we assume that lenders (banks) have a choice of investing in risky
loans along this frontier or in safe government bonds that pay a return, rf, in
period /. In making this choice we assume that banks are risk averse and char-
acterized by declining absolute risk aversion as their financial positions im-
prove.
2
8 Like some of the firms to which they lend, banks are assumed to be
run by mangers/decision makers who are not fully diversified (i.e., they are
disproportionately invested in the banks that they manage).
A useful starting point is to consider a case in which loan demand at any
interest rate below rm exceeds the total lending capacity of banks, and rf is
below fm. Then banks will always ration credit and the efficient investment
frontier for a bank runs along a line from the point r
gt on the vertical axis to a
tangency with the mean-variance loan return frontier traced out by varying
contractual rates of interest (see fig. 1.1). (At interest rates on government
bonds above fm, banks invest entirely in government bonds.) The tangency
point on the loan return frontier determines the terms on which bank loans are
made. It necessarily occurs at an expected return at or below fm and, thus,
entails a contractual loan rate at or below rm. The fraction of the bank's assets
devoted to commercial loans (on the terms determined by the tangency of the
efficient frontier and the loan return frontier) is then determined by the tan-24 Bruce C. Greenwald/Joseph E. Stiglitz
gency of the bank decision maker's mean-variance indifference curve with the
efficient frontier. This too is shown in figure 1.1. The position of this tangency
point depends on several factors.
As r
g falls toward zero, the point of tangency on the loan frontier may move
only very slightly, especially if the frontier has a shape like that shown in
figure 1.1. As a result, the contractual rate of interest charged borrowers may
be highly insensitive to changes in the rate of interest in public securities mar-
kets.
2
9 Nevertheless, as r
g falls, the tangency of the efficient frontier with the
bank indifference curves may change substantially leading to a significant
change in bank lending.
As the financial positions of firms improve, the quality of the overall bor-
rowing pool improves, since firms are less likely to default. This appears as a
shift upward in the loan return frontier, since at each contractual rate of inter-
est the expected return on loans rises and the variance of returns falls as de-
fault rates decline. The slope of the efficient frontier will then become steeper
and the tangency of the frontier with the decision makers' indifference curve
will move to the right (i.e., to a steeper point on the indifference curve).
3
0
Thus, the optimal bank portfolio will consist of a greater fraction of loans and
a smaller fraction of government bonds.
3
1 A reduction in the interest rate on
the government bonds will have a similar effect. An improvement in the finan-
cial position of a bank can be interpreted as a flattening of the risk-return
indifference curves (because of declining absolute risk aversion) and hence a
shift to the right in their tangency with the efficient frontier. This implies a




The actual level of bank commercial lending is the product of the share of
loans in the bank portfolio and the level of bank assets. The latter is, in turn,
just the sum of bank capital and deposits. Since we will assume that the
money supply consists only of deposits and that reserve requirements are
fixed, total loans are
(4) b, = \k-^ + Yt
where 1 > p > 0 is the fraction of bank assets loaned that depends on r
g, the
rate of return on government bonds, at_x, borrowing firm equity positions,
and a
b_y, the equity position of banks as they enter period t with (3, < 0,
P2 > 0, and P3 > 0. The variable y
b is bank capital in period t, k = 1 minus
the required reserve ratio, the nominal money supply is Mt, and Pt is the price
level, with all magnitudes except those last two being real variables.
The contractual rate of interest on loans in the rationing equilibrium is
(5) r, = a(rf,fl,_ ,),<*, > 0,
and a2 may be either positive or negative. Higher levels of firm equity lower
default rates, and lower default rates should lower rt, but these higher levels




Fig 1.1a Optimal bank behavior (no rationing case)
The level of bank equity does not affect rt in the rationing equilibrium be-
cause rt depends only on the tangency of the efficient frontier with the loan
return frontier. If, at this contractual interest rate, the demand for loans is less
than the amount that bank portfolio decisions make available (i.e., there is no
credit rationing), then competition among banks will drive down the contrac-
tual rate of interest (given that loan size remains fixed, as in Stiglitz-Weiss
1981). As this occurs bank loan returns move down along the loan return
frontier. The available efficient portfolio frontier under these circumstances
runs from the point r
gt on the vertical axis (see fig. 1.1a) to the point of the
loan return frontier corresponding to a particular contractual interest rate.
Along this new frontier banks select a portfolio mix which is tangent to their
risk-return indifference curves. At this tangency, lower contractual returns will
lead to less loan investment by banks and hence lower loan supply. At the
same time, lower contractual rates of interest increase loan demand. At some
point the two just balance and an equilibrium without credit rationing occurs.
However, under these conditions, rt still depends on rf and at_x, which affects
both loan demand and the position of the loan return frontier.
3
3
In order to complete the loan sector of the model, we must specify how
bank equity and bank capital evolve over time. For simplicity we assume that
bank capital may come only from reinvested earning. Bank capital borrowing




where iTf_ l is bank profitability and d
bt_, is the amount in bank dividends in
period t — 1.26 Bruce C. Greenwald/Joseph E. Stiglitz
The restrictions on capital borrowing and new equity issues might suggest
that bank capital (the net worth that appears in the bank's balance sheet) is
also bank equity, the discounted value of the bank's profits. However, that is
not the case. The equity of the bank, looking forward from the beginning of
period t, include the value of the bank's franchise as perceived by its manag-
ers. This will depend, if there are restrictions on entry and deposit interest, on
level of the expected future money supply and thus, in turn, on current mone-
tary policy. To keep things as simple as possible we will assume formally that
?_, = «?_, =
where |x,_p the value of the bank's franchise, depends upon current and ex-
pected future monetary policy.
The availability of credit to firms and the terms on which credit is made
available, therefore, depends on the financial condition of the firms them-
selves and that of the banking sector, which reinforces the cash flow and ac-
celerator-like investment behavior noted in section 1.1. Monetary policy af-
fects loan conditions through a number of channels. First, and perhaps least
important, monetary policy will affect the interest rate on government bonds.
This change in interest rates on government bonds may have a small and even
ambiguous effect on interest rates charged borrowers and hence on the de-
mand for funds. Second, changes in monetary policy will lead to changes in
the equity of banks due to changes in the perceived value of their franchises.
3
5
Third, monetary policy increases the assets in the hands of banks that are
available for loans to firms. This last effect is an artifact of the assumed re-
striction of lending in the model to banks. Monetary policy that shifts control
over financial investment funds from households to banks naturally increases
lending to firms if only banks are able to do this. However, to the extent that
banks enjoy special advantages in making loans to firms, a similar impact, but
one of lesser magnitude, would occur even if direct lending to firms were
allowed. Allowing banks to borrow for capital purposes would also offset this
third effect, but again (in the absence of perfect capital markets and perfect
deposit competition) only partially. Fourth, changes in monetary policy (re-
serve requirements and discount rates) directly affect the extent of bank lend-
ing and the bank's willingness and ability to lend.
1.3 The Macroeconomic Model
The changes introduced into a standard macroeconomic framework by in-
corporating the effects of financial market imperfections are extensive. How-
ever, much of the familiar structure of the traditional model can be preserved.
If the inherited equity levels of firms («,_,) and the level of environmental
uncertainty (af) are treated for the moment as exogenous parameters, then a
goods market equilibrium (suppressing these parameters for notational con-
venience) can be written27 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing
(f>\ v = i (Y h w ^ + Q -\- c (v
8 v ^
where yt is real output, it is real investment, gt is real government spending,
and ct is real consumption, which is assumed to depend on the level of output
and the interest rate on government bonds, r
g, which in turn is assumed to be
the interest rate available to consumers.
3
6 The principal difference from the
traditional IS curve is that financial market conditions are no longer embodied
in a single interest-rate variable, but rather in one interest rate facing consum-
ers (r
g) and two variables (rt,bt) that capture the loan market conditions, in-
volving both price and quantity rationing, facing firms.
The financial market equilibrium (LM curve) interacting with the goods
market described above implicitly consists of four financial markets: (1) a
money market equating the supply and demand for demand deposits, (2) a
government bond market equating the demand for government bonds to the
existing supply, (3) the market for loans described in the previous section, and
(4) a market for the fixed amount of outstanding common stock of firms.
The last of these markets can be ignored in the analysis which follows. This
stock market can be thought of as equilibrating the supply and demand for
shares through the determination of a stock price per share. Since equity sales
are excluded in the model, this stock price does not influence investment;
since in this model consumption does not depend on perceived wealth, it does
not affect consumption demand.
3
7 Nor does its interaction with other asset
markets need to be considered. Strictly speaking, stock price should enter the
demand curves for both money and government bonds (and loans if banks
were allowed to own common stocks), but in this case the stock price could
be eliminated by solving for stock prices from the stock supply-and-demand
equation and substituting into the money and government bond market equa-
tions.
Similarly, the money and government bond demand equations can be solved
to yield a reduced-form equation for the government bond interest rate in
terms of the real supplies of government bonds and money and the level of
output, yt, which presumably affects money demand. This is roughly equiva-
lent to a traditional LM curve and will be written formally as
(T) r« = € v — —- €>0^>0f<0
where G, is the outstanding nominal amount of government debt.
The principal innovation that arises from credit rationing is the introduction
of equations (4) and (5) describing the loan behavior of banks. These deter-
mine rt and bt as functions of rf given the equity positions of banks, a
bt_x; the
equity positions of borrowing firms, at_{, the levels of environmental uncer-
tainty (crf) and wages (vvf), which affect the demand for bank loans; and the
levels of bank capital (7f_,) and the money supply (Mt/Pt), which determine
bank resources. For analytical purposes, because two loan-market variables28 Bruce C. Greenwald/Joseph E. Stiglitz
are involved, the simplest approach is to incorporate the loan-market equilib-
rium into the IS curve by substituting from equations (4) and (5) into the
investment function of equation (6). This yields a goods-market equilibrium
of the form
(ft) x = i\r\r
g —' w \ h \r
g —'- w 1 + s + c(r
g v)
\°f Jt
 ltv ty f> p' ' ' ' f p' ' I *'
 LA'/' JO
i L *if J L *< J J
where the variables a,_, a
bt_x, <jt, and qt_x have been suppressed as parame-
ters. Since rt is increasing and bt is decreasing in rf, an increase in rf reduces
investment demand and hence aggregate demand. This credit-rationing-
modified IS curve is, therefore, downward sloping in the usual way.
3
8
The traditional macroeconomic equilibrium is then depicted in figure 1.2
with the intersection of the IS and LM curves determining an equilibrium level
of output and the government bond interest rate for any given level of real
wages. It also has several familiar properties. An increase in government debt
shifts the LM curve upward, leading to an increase in interest rates and a
reduction in output.
3
9 Also, the model is characterized by the standard neu-
trality result. If the government debt and the money supply are increased pro-
portionately, then prices increase in the same proportion and real magnitudes
are unchanged. The same result arises, if the taxes required for debt service
are fully discounted by taxpayers and the money supply increases.
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In particular, an increase in the (real) money supply shifts both the LM curve
downward and the modified IS curve to the right, since such a shift directly
increases bank lending. As a result it is conceivable, given the relative mag-
nitudes of these shifts, that an increase in the money supply could lead to
higher equilibrium output and higher interest rates on government bonds.
And, since monetary policy affects the IS curve directly, its effect on total
output is likely to be far more significant than that of government debt opera-
tions alone, which affect only the LM curve. This seems to be borne out by
empirical observations. The added potency of money supply changes arises
because it shifts resources into and out of the hands of financial institutions
with particular access to borrower information.
Furthermore, unanticipated monetary policy may have stronger impacts
still. Assuming that most firms have nominal liabilities (bonds, bank debt,
taxes payable, etc.) and real assets, an unexpected monetary expansion may
lead to a transfer from lenders (ultimately households) to firms, enhancing the
equity positions of firms. This would lead to a further rightward shift in the IS
curve, a further increase in output, and more upward pressure on interest
rates.
Another exogenous factor that exerts a particular influence in this credit and
equity rationing model is an increase in the uncertainties faced or perceived
by individual firms. In practice, this could correspond either to an increase in
the overall rate of inflation (which has empirically been related to increased
relative price fluctuations and to increased variability in the rate of inflation)
or to an increase in the unpredictability of monetary policy (as in 1979-82).
Such an increase in uncertainty would reduce investment demand both di-
rectly and indirectly through its effect on bank lending terms.
4
0 The IS curve
of equation (8) would shift to the left, and equilibrium output and real interest
rates would fall (although the change in actual loan rates might be small).
The model is completed by an equilibrium in the labor market that deter-
mines the real wage, wt, as a function of the IS-LM equilibrium. The labor
demand curve in this market is just the marginal product of labor at a given
level of output net of the incremental risk of bankruptcy borne by managers
as output (and employment) increases. This is a downward sloping marginal
product curve of the usual sort as shown in figure 1.3. However, this labor
demand curve shifts with the financial position of firms. An improvement in a
firm's equity position reduces the incremental risk associated with increased
output (and employment) at any given output level. Thus, unanticipated shifts
in monetary policy that lead to changes in firm equity positions will shift the
labor demand curve. Similarly, credit rationing restrictions and the cost of
paying workers in advance of production may change the marginal product of
labor (net of associated material and interest costs)
4
1 in response to changes in
loan-market conditions.
The labor supply relationship may be embodied in either an upward sloping
supply curve of the usual sort or a no-shirking constraint of the kind developed30 Bruce C. Greenwald/Joseph E. Stiglitz
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Fig. 1.3 Labor-market equilibrium
in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In both cases, shifts in policy that change the
labor demand curve (by inducing shifts in either firm equity positions, loan-
market conditions, or the uncertainty of the economic environment) will lead
to changes in equilibrium employment, wages, and output (see fig. 1.3). In
the case of a labor-supply function there will be no associated unemployment.
In the case of a no-shirking constraint (efficiency wage) model, the shift in the
labor-market equilibrium will be associated with a change in unemployment.
In both cases the change in wages will tend to offset, but only partially, the
contemporary change in output at constant wages predicted by the IS-LM in-
teraction. Finally, it should be noted that these changes in output may be rela-
tively short-lived (in contrast to the supply effects of capital accumulation)
since firm financial conditions may change relatively quickly (along with
loan-market conditions), and they do not depend on any arbitrary nominal
price rigidities (in contrast to tradition Keynesian models).
1.4 Short-term Adjustment
The equilibrium shift in output and wages implied by a particular move-
ment in the labor demand curve (see fig. 1.3) should, given the likely slopes
of either the labor supply or the nonshirking constraint curve, involve signifi-
cant changes in both wages and output (employment). However, with imper-
fect information, the adjustment path to the new equilibrium is likely to in-
volve large initial changes in output (employment) and only small changes in
wages. This possibility is based on three simple assumptions in addition to the31 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing
assumption that firm decision makers are risk averse; namely, (1) that firms
are uncertain of the impact of their actions, (2) that this uncertainty increases
with the size of movements from the status quo, and (3) that uncertainties
associated with price and wage changes are greater than those associated with
quantity changes (e.g., in output or unemployment). The first two of these
assumptions should be uncontroversial, but the last is central and requires
some explanation, which will be provided below.
The reason that rates of adjustment concerning the impacts of different de-
cision variables are related to their relative uncertainties can be seen intui-
tively as follows. If firms are risk averse, then they will consider both the
mean and the variance of the returns yielded by different combinations of
changes in decision variables. As firms make adjustments, the expected value
and the variance of profits change together. However, if uncertainty concern-
ing the impact of one decision variable A (a price) is greater than uncertainty
concerning the impact of another decision variable B (a quantity), then, other
things being equal, the optimal portfolio of adjustments will contain less
movement in A than B.
42 Following such initial changes, which are greater in
B than in A, the expected returns to further changes in A are likely to rise
relative to the expected returns to changes in B (since B will now be closer to
its new optimal value). Thus, ultimately, A may adjust as extensively as B, but
in the short run A will exhibit inertia relative to B.
One important qualification must, however, be made to this simple descrip-
tion. When the consequences of actions are particularly uncertain, and firms
are particularly risk averse, it is sometimes suggested that firms will simply
maintain the status quo. But what does it mean to continue doing what you
were doing before? Does it mean keeping absolute prices fixed, or relative
prices? Absolute wages, or relative wages? We provide here an answer: very
risk-averse firms will take those actions that minimize the variability of their
profits. Thus, in speaking in the previous paragraph of the magnitude of
changes in A relative to B, these must be interpreted as changes from the
minimum variance point, not as changes from preexisting levels. If the eco-
nomic environment is one in which the variance of profit is related to relative
wages or prices, firms will minimize variance by keeping relative wages or
prices fixed. Thus, in the present model, the minimum variance response is
one of no change in real magnitudes.
4
3
The arguments just given imply that short-term movement in real wages
from the no-change point will be relatively small compared to those of output
and employment, if firm decision makers face relatively large uncertainties
about the effects of wage changes. In efficiency wage models this is likely to
be the case. The usual efficiency wage assumption is that average productivi-
ties can be observed accurately. Thus, if a large group of workers is laid off or
not replaced (where there is substantial normal turnover), the lost labor supply
is just the number of workers involved times average productivity. There is
little or no uncertainty about this. However, firms are likely to be much less32 Bruce C. Greenw aid/Joseph E. Stiglitz
certain of the impact of a wage change on labor supply since this involves
estimating the impact of wage changes on turnover (both in quality and quan-
tity) and worker performance. Neither is likely to be known very accurately,
nor can these effects be ascertained immediately following any initial wage
change (they take time to become manifest). Similarly, if firms who produce
to inventory know the impact of output changes on both inventories and costs
with little uncertainty, but are highly uncertain of the effects of price changes
on both inventories (via sales) and revenues, then these firms will focus pre-
dominantly on output rather than price adjustments in the short run. The result
will then be a pattern very similar to that which is observed in practice, of
adjustment characterized by rapid output and employment changes and small
wages and price changes.
1.5 Long-term Dynamics
The long-run dynamics of the model are driven by rates of accumulation in
capital and equity and changes in technology, themselves driven by R&D in-
vestments. For simplicity, we will assume that bank and firm capital grow in
proportion (because of structures of relative profitability in banking and pro-
duction activities), and that CT,, the environmental uncertainty, is fixed. The
IS-LM labor demand-labor supply equilibrium for given real money and real
government debt levels can be solved to yield a level of equity accumulation
as a function of at_, and presumably kt. In this reduced form function,
i, = g(kt, at_x), 8l>0, g2>0.
Higher levels of firm equity (and higher levels of physical capital) tend to lead
to higher levels of output and investment. In steady state, investment must
replace depreciation and equip new workers entering the labor force (if the
labor force is growing). Thus, in steady state,
(9) i = (8 + ri)k = g(k, a),
where n is the rate of growth of the labor force, k and a must now be inter-
preted as per capita magnitudes, and we assume constant returns to scale (in-
cluding in the bankruptcy cost function). In a general equilibrium context, g,
should be less than 8 + n (because increased capital that increases wages and
interest rates has a relatively small general-equilibrium effect on new invest-
ment demand). Under such a condition, the steady-state levels of a and k in
equation (9) are related by an upward sloping curve (see fig. 1.4). This is
essentially an equity demand curve. It describes the level of equity per capita
in steady state that is required to generate sufficient investment to sustain a
particular level of the per capita capital stock. For levels of a below this curve,
the per capita capital stock will be declining. For the levels of a above the
curve, k will be increasing.





Fig. 1.4 Long-run steady state
scribed as an equity supply curve. Higher levels of both the capital stock and
equity tend to increase output, drive up wages, and ultimately reduce profit
rates and retained earnings per worker. Since retained earnings are the source
of equity growth and since equity per capita must grow in steady-state condi-
tions at a proportional rate n, the steady-state equity demand relationship is
(10) na = h(k, a), hx <0,h2< 0,
which is a downward sloping curve (see fig. 4). This second curve intersects
the equity demand curve at the long-run steady state of the equity and credit
rationing model. A simple phase plane analysis indicates that the equilibrium
is stable with dynamic paths that may either return monotonically (most
likely) or cyclically to equilibrium. Thus, temporary deviations in firm equity
levels, due, for example, to unexpected money supply changes, are ultimately
eliminated as the model returns over time to the long-run steady state. Cycles
in these models appear, therefore, like most observed business cycles to be
self-limiting.
This long-run steady state can also be used to study long-run comparative
statics. For example, a sudden increase in uncertainty (CT,) shifts the equity





The important point to note about the macroeconomic implications of even
the relatively simple model of credit and equity rationing developed here is34 Bruce C. Greenwald/Joseph E. Stiglitz
that this model describes, remarkably accurately, many aspects of observed
aggregate behavior, which are difficult to account for in terms of traditional
macroeconomic models. At the same time, it embodies realistic microeco-
nomic assumptions about information availability, which produces highly rea-
sonable microeconomic descriptions of firm and lending institution behavior.
Appendix
This Appendix describes the structure of information that underlies the mi-
croeconomic description of firm-level behavior in Section 1.1 of this paper. In
doing so, it will be useful to begin with the model of the text altered only
slightly to include an additive productivity factor, 6,, which is unobservable to
outside investors but known with certainty by a firm's managers, so that the
profits of the firm are
77, - ptq, - (1 + rt)b, + 8,.
Substitution from the definition of bt, and normalization so that €,, output per
unit of labor, is one, yields
ir, = [p, - (1 + >•>,]<?, + (1 + r,)a,-i + 6,,
where pt is the price at which goods are sold at the end of period t, w, is the
wage level, qt is output (investment) in period t, rt is the return to lenders, and
at_x denotes the equity funds that the firm inherits from period t — 1. At the
beginning of each period, each firm receives an independent 8, draw from a
distribution that is the same for all firms.
4
5 This distribution has E[0,] = 0 and
a range [6a, 0J. At the beginning of a period a firm knows wt, qt, at_x, rt, and 6, with certainty. It also knows the distribution of pt but not the particular
realized value of pt, which materializes only at the end of the period.
At the beginning of period t, neither qt nor 6, is observable to outside inves-
tors. We will also assume for the moment that lending to firms is done by
banks who have access to confidential firm information (i.e., they observe 6,
and qt), but are constrained not to reveal that information either by revealing
borrowing levels, bt, or by acting upon it (i.e., by purchasing the stock of a
firm in the open market). Thus only at_ x for each firm is observable to outside
(i.e., nonbank) investors at the beginning of period t.
We assume that financial contracts are limited to either (1) debt contracts,
which provide a fixed return, rt, if a firm is solvent or, in the event of insol-
vency, all the assets of the firm, or (2) equity contracts, which provide a fixed
fraction of the firm's net worth if the firm is solvent and nothing otherwise. In
practice, under equity contracts share owners receive their returns through
dividends. We will assume that loans are made by banks, which are owned,35 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing
in turn, by households, and that equity is held directly by households (i.e.,
Glass-Steagall-like restraints restrict bank ownership of common stock). We
will also assume initially, that all investors are risk neutral and require an
expected rate of return, ft, on their investments.
Under these circumstances, the equation determining the level of rt, the
contractual rate of return on loans, directly determines the probability that a
firm goes bankrupt (i.e., IT, ^ 0). From the definition of IT,, bankruptcy in-
plies that
where, by definition, ut is the price realization below which firms go bank-
rupt. The expected total return to investors is, therefore,
"t
b,£(l + r,) = (Q, • q, + 6,)[1 - F(u,)] + J (qtPt + Qt)dF(Pl),
0
since, at prices above ut, lenders receive ut per unit of output plus 0, and, at
prices below ut, lenders as residual claimants receive the entire pt per unit of
output plus 0, again. The level of rt, and hence ut, is then set so that this
expected return is equal to (1 + f,)b,. Thus, substitution for b, and rearrange-
ment of terms yield
= u, (1 -
which is just the equation of the text modified by the inclusion of the 0, factor
(which is observed by bank lenders).
Expected profits are also a simple extension of those in the text. In particu-
lar,
rr)L_ +?,
Thus, in both instances (expected profits and the definition of ut), the effect of
the additive productivity factor, 0,, is to replace a(_,byflr_, + 0,/(l + ft),
and the output function of the firm can be written
where the function h is exactly that of the text.
4
6 If therefore, we define
0,
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then the analysis can proceed directly in terms of z,_, instead of at_v Since qt
is linear in z, and ut is a function of the ratio of qt and zt, ut is independent of
zr Thus, the objective function of firms
[1 - (1 + r,)wt]q, + (1 + ft)zt - cqtF(ut),
is linear in zt, and the end-of-period valuation function for the multiperiod
problem is linear in end-of-period equity, as are future expected profits (and
their discounted value). The expected end-of-period market value of the firm
is therefore,
E[Vt] = kE[zt+l] = kE[at+l] = k'z,,
where k' and k will depend on wt, ft, at and their future expected values, and
the second equality follows from the fact that £[0J = 0, ex ante, for each t.
Now consider a decision to raise an amount of equity, eo. The share of the
firm retained by the original shareholders depends on the market value of the
firm when it decides to issue equity, Vot, where
where the expectations are now taken conditional on the information available
to outside equity investors. Thus
£[8,/equity issued]
The share of the firm sold to new shareholders is
s = o + V
The cost of this equity sale from the perspective of the firm's inside managers
is
s • k'(zt + e0) = sk\at_x + eo + j-^j,
since they observe 0,. Since the new equity simply increases af_p the value of
the equity issue, eo, is k' • e0. Thus, the condition that firms issue equity is
simply
[ ^] ^ (eo + VJ • k'eo,
or, after rearranging terms,
(Al) 0, ^ (k' - 1)0,^(1 + f) + A:'£[8/equity issued].37 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing




(A2) 8, ^ £[8/equity issued].
This condition implies, in turn, that no equity will be issued. The expectation
of 6r for equity issuers would be derived only from those with 0, less than that
expectation (i.e., those who issue equity according to eq. [A2] above), and
this can only occur at 0a, the lower limit of the 6 distribution, where essen-
tially no one issues equity. Thus, no equilibrium without equity issue restric-
tions is compatible with the information structure assumed here.
However, an equilibrium with such restrictions and consequently k' > 1,
may exist. In that case, it is still firms for which 0f is less than or equal to
some threshold of those who issue equity (see eq. [Al]) and, in consequence,
£[0/equity issued] < £[0/no equity issued].
Thus, firms announcing equity issues will face an immediate decline in cur-
rent market value. If current, as well as end-of-period, market value enters a
firm's objective function,
4
8 this will in turn represent an additional fixed cost
of issuing equity and a further deterrent to doing so. In practice, therefore,
asymmetric information concerning firm prospects (i.e., 0,) between manag-
ers and outside investors may well restrict equity issues to a small number of
firms and an insignificant amount of funds, as appears to be the case in prac-
tice.
4
9 This is the underlying rationale for the equity issue constraint.
In relaxing the informational assumptions described above, the obvious
place to begin is with the assumptions of well-informed bank lenders. If banks
cannot distinguish among potential borrowers (i.e., they cannot observe qt or
0f), then the contractual rate of interest rt must be set at the same level for all
firms. Under these circumstances, the analysis must be adjusted slightly but
remains fundamentally unchanged. There is an induced tendency for poor
(i.e., low 0f) firms to borrow more since they have higher default rates and
hence lower expected interest costs for any r, than good (i.e., high 0,) firms.
This does not, however, alter the linearity of the problem in z, so that the basic
qualitative results of the fully informed lender case continue to apply (slightly
stronger assumptions are needed to ensure that the second-order maximum
conditions are satisfied).
A further difficulty is raised if lenders are able to infer 0, from the level of
firm borrowing and reveal this information to investors at large. However, in
this case, poor firms would have an incentive to increase borrowing (and in-
vest in nonproduction technologies) to conceal their low 0, values from the
market. At the same time, very poor firms (i.e., those with zt < 0) have an
incentive to borrow a great deal (since the probability of bankruptcy declines
with output for such firms) so that the need for viable firms to distinguish
themselves from very poor firms should set an upper limit on borrowing.38 Bruce C. Greenwald/Joseph E. Stiglitz
Thus, if lenders attempted to infer firm quality from borrowing levels, there
would be a countervailing tendency for all firms to borrow the same amount
and equilibria exist in which borrowing levels are constant across firms and
uninformative.
Notes
1. See Lucas (1979).
2. See Bernanke and Geitler (1989), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Diamond (1982)
and Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) for diverse examples from a large and grow-
ing literature.
3. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
4. See Myers and Majluf (1984) and Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984). Empir-
ical support for these models is provided by Asquith and Mullins (1986) and in exten-
sive related literature.
5. See Weiss (1980), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Stiglitz (1974, 1976), Akerlof
(1984), Bulow and Summers (1985) and Salop and Salop (1976) for examples on
efficiency wage models of labor-market behavior; see Stiglitz (1987) on similar models
of product markets. For surveys of macroeconomic phenomena see Stiglitz (1982,
1987) and Yellen (1984); on paths of adjustment, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989).
6. Similar results obtain if firms maximize an expected utility (or valuation func-
tion) of end-of-period equity if the utility function is characterized by decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion.
7. We assume that, for a variety of informational reasons, futures markets are not a
significant economic factor (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986).
8. The restriction to only labor inputs is made solely for expositional convenience.
The effect of relaxing the constant-returns-to-scale assumption is examined in Green-
wald and Stiglitz (1986).
9. The importance of bankruptcy itself in this regard is that it represents identifiable
failure as opposed to other failures that may be at least partially obscured by account-
ing flexibility.
10. Although there is some literature stressing that the direct costs of bankruptcy
are small, this literature may in fact greatly underestimate the total costs, which in-
clude the fact that assets may be tied up during the process of reorganization.
11. In most models in which reorganization costs are small, lenders face imperfect
information about the risks of investment projects, and managers serve the interests of
shareholders; managers should seek high-risk projects that increase shareholder returns
at the expense of lenders. Under these conditions one would expect bankruptcy to be a
frequent occurrence.
12. If lenders are risk averse, the required return will be a function of the bank-
ruptcy probability, which in turn depends on ut. Formally, eq. (2) holds, with f imply-
ing a function of ut.
13. This result depends on the constant-returns-to-scale production assumption (see
Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986 for details), which are quite general.
14. These comparative static propositions depend on imposing restrictions on F,
which ensure that the second-order conditions are satisfied.
15. The value of equity in providing protection against bankruptcy is also greater
for low- than high-productivity firms, since low-productivity firms are in greater dan-
ger of bankruptcy.39 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing
16. In practice, since dividend levels typically involve an implied promise of conti-
nuity, reducing dividends to obtain equity funds is likely to be less appealing than
issuing equity, since the current equity yield is likely to be smaller.
17. However, in practice, there are complications introduced by the existence of
long-lived capital. If loans are made on a short-term basis, then a bankruptcy constraint
must be defined for each subperiod, t, which, in turn, requires that there be some
means of valuing fixed capital at these intervening times. Doing this is not straight-
forward. Also, firms typically invest in both fixed and working capital. Thus, each
individual decision period entails choices of both long-lived investment and current
output. The interaction of these two kinds of decisions also significantly complicates
the analysis, although it does not change its fundamental implications.
18. See Eisner (1967), Jorgenson (1963) and Lintner (1971) for examples of a large
literature.
19. A second accelerator-like effect also arises if there is fixed capital and an in-
crease in demand for a firm's output is persistent. Then past increases in output and
profitability are likely to be indicators of future profitability, which would raise the
value of a firm's fixed capital stock. In a world without informational imperfections,
any such increases in future profitability would be reflected in the market values of
firms and would enter a classical investment equation through Tobin's q. In a model
with imperfect information, it is the perception of the managers of a firm, based on
their private information, which matter, and these perceptions matter in two distinct
ways. First, parallel to the classical effect, a rise in future expected return (i.e., an in-
crease in expected prices relative to wt) will directly elicit higher levels of output. But,
in addition, higher future profitability increases the flow of future equity funds and af-
fects output (investment) through that channel as well; this second effect is operative only
if the firm cannot raise new capital through new equity issues. In practice, of course,
stock market valuations and internal firm assessments may be highly correlated, espe-
cially in cross-sectional data, so that the two models will be hard to distinguish. Never-
theless there are important differences between the two. For example, in the past, stock
market values have appeared to fluctuate without any clear relationship to future firm
profitability and cash flow. Such fluctations would affect Tobin's q and investment in
the classical sense, but would not affect investment in the model presented here.
20. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and the discussion below in sec. 1.2.
21. See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
22. These same factors also explain why properly specified neoclassical investment
models like those of Abel (1980) and Abel and Blanchard (1986) perform relatively
less well empirically than simple accelerator models.
23. See Phelps and Winter (1970) for a model of this kind.
24. See Zarnowitz (1985).
25. A critical issue to be discussed in subsequent research is the extent to which
nonbank lending is a substitute for bank lending. This substitution is of both theoretical
and empirical relevance. See Vale (1989).
26. See discussion in the Appendix concerning loan sizes and the information to be
derived from observing loan sizes.
27. Since these default risks are, in practice, correlated across borrowers, the law
of large numbers does not effectively eliminate the total risk facing even large banks.
28. Note that this represents a departure from the perfectly informed, risk-neutral
lenders of sec. 1.1. However, accommodating such behavior does not fundamentally
alter the characteristics of the firm-level model.
29. Formally,
lim -^ -»- 0, -^ < 0, for r' < r
m.
rf-.r» dr' dr<
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30. This is not quite the whole story. The point of tangency with the loan return
frontier will also shift—under most circumstances—to the left. Thus the share of loans
represented by any point along the horizontal axis will increase, and the total increase
in the loan share in the bank's portfolio will consist of the combined effects of the shift
in the tangency with the indifference curve and the shift in tangency with the loan
return frontier. Also, as the tangency with the loan return frontier changes, the contrac-
tual rate of interest charged to firms changes.
31. The substitution effect always leads to more loans. The income effect does too,
provided there is decreasing absolute risk aversion.
32. Alternatively, the increase in the bank's financial position could be interpreted
as a shift upward in expected terminal wealth, where the mean-variance diagram is
taken over values of terminal wealth rather than returns. This would move the whole
picture to a region of the indifference map with flatter indifference curves (since abso-
lute risk aversion has declined).
33. If banks can distinguish among categories of potential borrowers, this process
of increasing loan demand will entail the making of the loans to successively less
attractive groups and rationing the marginal group in equilibrium.
34. The borrowing restriction here has no significant impact on the implications of
the model.
35. This is similar in spirit, but likely to be more significant in magnitude than the
wealth effect of monetary policy.
36. This consumption function, which is common to traditional macroeconomic
models, is used for the sake of simplicity. A full general equilibrium model with inter-
temporal consumer utility maximization is developed in Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1986). A model with a consumption function modified to take account of permanent
income in a rational expectations context is developed in Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1988). Another general equilibrium alternative is developed by Woodford (1986),
who incorporates endogenous borrowing constraints.
37. Relaxing this condition would complicate the analysis without altering its fun-
damental conclusions.
38. The same results apply, of course, to this noncredit rationed IS curve.
39. This assumes that the increase in the supply of government debt is not com-
pletely offset by an increase in demand for government debt in anticipation of higher
future taxes. Moreover, since the consequences of the source of the increase in debt
(i.e. higher government spending or lower taxes) are not considered, the change should
be interpreted in terms of a comparison of a high-debt economy (for historical reasons)
to a low-debt economy.
40. These changes in uncertainty also affect the whole curve, shifting the relative
demands for different financial assets.
41. Taking into account shadow prices associated with financial constraints and
bankruptcy.
42. Uncertainty here is appropriately defined in terms of the covariance matrix of
uncertainties concerning the impacts of the several decision variables.
43. These arguments are developed in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989).
44. If learning by doing is incorporated into the model, different steady states cor-
respond to different growth rates as well as different levels and temporary deviations
from steady state have persistent effects on the level of output (see Greenwald and
Stiglitz 1989).
45. This restriction is of no practical significance since different 0 distributions
would correspond to observationally different classes of firms and we need only repli-
cate the analysis for each such class.
46. The use of a more realistic multiplicative productivity factor would merely
complicate the analysis without altering its basic implications.41 Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing
47. In general, k' exceeds one, because without being able to issue unlimited
amounts of equity, positive bankruptcy risk ensures that (1 + f)wt < 1, and firms
make positive profits per unit of output. Since equity increases output, it earns these
positive profits in addition to the normal return (1 + r).
48. Such a situation will arise if firms serve existing shareholders and existing
shareholders sell a fraction of their current holdings in the beginning of each period
(after equity issues have been announced). An overlapping generations model, in
which current shareholders are older households consuming wealth at a fixed rate, will
give rise to such a situation.
49. With decreasing returns to scale, the value of additional equity is also smaller
for high-0 firms than low-9 firms since the extra output made possible by the additional
equity is incrementally less valuable at the high-8 firms' higher levels of output. See
Taggart(1985).
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